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Abstract
In crisis bargaining literature, it is conventional wisdom that the ability of generating higher
audience costs is an advantage for a leader of a state. However, empirical studies show that
democratic states use this mechanism only occasionally. This paper formally shows that
higher audience costs may be good or bad depending on (1) the benefit-cost ratio of the
crisis, (2) initial probability of resolve, and (3) how fast states generate audience costs with
time. In particular, if the value of the prize over the cost of attacking is low or the initial
probability of resolve is high enough, then having greater ability to generate audience costs
may undermine democratic states’ diplomatic success.
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1. Introduction
A growing literature on crisis bargaining argues that the presence of domestic audiences
is the major source of diplomatic success. The idea that some leaders have an easier time
generating audience costs is advanced in the seminal paper of James Fearon (1994) as a
plausible working hypothesis that has interesting theoretical and empirical implications. In
a world with audience costs, the risk of losing public support or even office, signaling incom-
petence, or losing international/national credibility could discourage leaders from making
empty threats and promises. That is, audience costs may occur if the leader makes public
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threats or commitments but fails to carry through on them.1 They help because leaders that
are more sensitive to audience costs are less likely to bluff, and thus, the threats they make
are more likely to be genuine. As a result, the targets of their challenges should be less likely
to resist.
It is conventional wisdom that the ability of generating higher audience costs is an ad-
vantage for a leader, and thus, making a firm public stand strengthens a country’s position
and gives it the upper hand in a crisis. This idea actually emerges from Fearon’s original
model of crisis bargaining. In that model, each state’s (ex-ante) expected payoff increases
with the state’s sensitivity to audience costs. Fearon explicitly states this point in his paper
in several occasions and adds (page 585), “This result provides a rationale for why, ex-ante,
both democratic and authoritarian leaders would want to be able to generate significant
audience costs in international contests.”
However, despite the sincere efforts that have been made to support the conjectures
derived from the audience costs theory, empirical studies could not help but increase the
skeptic views about the validity of this theoretically plausible mechanism. The works of
Trachtenberg (2012) and Snyder and Borghard (2011), two recent empirical papers, discuss
that leaders make use of this mechanism infrequently. For example, in 1990, prior to the
Gulf War, President Bush made explicit foreign policy statements regarding Iraq’s invasion
of Kuwait and threatened Saddam Hussein. By comparison, U.S. policy toward Bosnia was
less direct. Both presidents Bush and Clinton adopted vague, ambiguous policies toward
the Bosnian crisis, and U.S. intervention was limited (Smith 1998). Likewise, the United
Kingdom made very mild threats to Iran during the Abadan Crisis of 1951 but issued serious
warnings to Argentina during the Falkland Islands crisis in 1982.
In light of analogous historical examples, it could be the case—as opposed to the common
belief—that audience costs do not help leaders in all crises. This paper formally proves this.
In particular, I show that if the value of the good in dispute is low or if war is not expected
to go well, then having greater sensitivity to audience costs could be bad.2
1For further discussions about the microfoundations of audience costs, see Smith (1998), Guisinger and
Smith (2002), Schultz (2001), and Slantchev (2006). For empirical evidence that audience costs exist, see
Eyerman and Hart (1996), Gelpi and Griesdorf (2001), Partell and Palmer (1999), Prins (2003), Leventoglu
and Tarar (2005), and Tomz (2007).
2Schultz (2012) supports this argument with no formal treatment.
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For this purpose, I use the crisis bargaining game of Fearon (1994) with no structural
change, except the modeling of the asymmetric information. In the spirit of Harsanyi (1967),
I assume that each state has two types: resolved and flexible (i.e., not resolved). A resolved
leader is stubborn and committed not to back down. The flexible type has no commitment
to his demand and is willing to back down and mimic the resolved type (i.e., bluff) if optimal.
This interpretation of resolve is consistent with that of Schelling (1966): he suggests that
states may be resolved or not and that they wish to build reputation in order to increase
their credibility in international conflicts.
Readers who are not familiar with the technical details of Fearon’s crisis bargaining game
may prefer to skip the next subsection and directly go to Section 2, where I explain the details
of the infinite-horizon, continuous-time game. Section 3 provides the main results of this
paper. In Section 3.1, I compare and contrast Fearon’s original results with the current
one(s). Section 4 discusses some simple extensions, showing that we need to distinguish
between the level of audience costs and the derivative of audience costs. In particular, I
show in Section 4 that a higher level of audience costs is always good, but a higher derivative
of audience costs is not. Finally, I conclude in Section 5.
1.1. Overview of the Model and of the Results
Fearon’s crisis bargaining game is an infinite-horizon, continuous-time game between two
states. These two players are in a dispute over a prize worth vi > 0 for each, and at all times
t ≥ 0 before the crisis ends, each player can choose to escalate, back down (quit), or attack.
The crisis ends when one or both states attack or quit. If either state attacks before the
other quits, the dispute ends with war, and each state i receives the (net expected) payoff
of −wi < 0, indicating all the risks and gains in a military intervention. If state i quits at
time t ≥ 0 before the other has backed down or attacked, then its adversary j receives the
prize, while state i suffers audience costs equal to ci(t), a continuous and strictly increasing
function of the amount of escalation t. Fearon supposes for simplicity that each state’s
audience costs function is linear on time, and so ci(t) = cit with ci > 0. Therefore, state 1
is more sensitive to audience costs if and only if c1 > c2.
Fearon (1994) assumes that each state i knows its own cost of war (i.e., wi) but knows only
the distribution of its adversary’s cost. Both players are willing to quit in Fearon’s model if
doing so is optimal for them. That is, Fearon does not assume resolved types (who never quit
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the crisis bargaining game) a priori. However, in equilibrium, a player that has low cost of
war prefers to play a strategy in which he never quits. Therefore, the stubborn behavior—or
the resolved type—is endogenously implied by the equilibrium in Fearon (1994). On the
other hand, the model in this paper supposes that each state holds a positive prior belief
that its rival is resolved. Once the dispute becomes public (i.e., after time 0), these initial
priors are updated according to the flexible players’ equilibrium strategies, which depend on
the prospects of the crisis (such as the players’ value for the prize and the cost of war). That
is, flexible players build reputation on their resolve in order to increase their credibility in
the crisis bargaining game.
A leader who is engaged in a dispute with another state may be resolved because of his
firm belief that backing down, and thus giving up for the prize, is simply a decision that will
not be ratified by domestic actors (Iida 1993). Or the leader may want to signal competence
and increase his/her chance of reelection. Therefore, a leader may commit not to back down
in a crisis for reasons other than the prospects of the crisis, and positive priors about states’
resolve may be interpreted as the states’ initial beliefs on the existence of such motives.
Unlike Fearon (1994), this alternative modeling implies cases where a state is resolved even
when the prospects of the crisis are low and a state is flexible even if the prospects of the
crisis are high.
The main implication of this modeling is that Fearon’s conclusion—higher sensitivity
to audience costs is good—may not hold when the players’ prior beliefs, relative to the
prospects of the crisis, are high enough. In the current model, there are two commitment
devices that flexible players can use to make their bluff credible. The first one is the cost of
war and the ability of generating audience costs. The second one is the players’ reputation
on resolve. In equilibrium, both states play a mixed strategy, but the state that is less
sensitive to audience costs (call it state 2) quits with a greater rate. Therefore, state 2 builds
its reputation faster.3 Building reputation requires time, and so, reputation for resolve is a
credible commitment device when states expect a long horizon for the crisis or have high
initial reputation. Therefore, if the relative likelihood of a state being the resolved type
exceeds the benefit-cost ratio of the crisis, then the states are no longer in Fearon’s regime
and so state 2 is advantaged. This case never occurs in Fearon’s model because his modeling
3Given its equilibrium strategy, a player’s reputation at time t is the conditional probability that this
player is the resolved type, conditional on the event that the player has not yet quit prior to time t.
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of the uncertainty (or resolve) indirectly gives the reputational advantage to the state that
is more sensitive to audience costs.4
2. The Model
Two states (or leaders), 1 and 2, are in dispute over a prize (e.g., territory, valuable
resources, or austerity measures) worth vi > 0 for each state i ∈ {1, 2}. The crisis occurs in
continuous time. At all times t ≥ 0 before the crisis ends, each state can choose to escalate
(wait), back down (quit), or attack. The crisis ends when one or both states attack or quit.
Payoffs are given as follows: If either state attacks before the other quits, the dispute
ends with war, and each state i receives the (net expected) payoff of −wi < 0. It indicates
all the risks and gains in a military intervention. That is, wi is the cost of attacking less the
expected benefit of attacking.5 The inequality −wi < 0 indicates that not being involved in
the dispute is more desirable than attacking. If state i concedes at time t before the other
has backed down or attacked, then its opponent j receives the prize, while state i suffers
audience costs equal to ci(t), a continuous and strictly increasing function of the amount
of escalation with ci(t) ≥ 0 for all t. Only the state that backs down experiences audience
costs.
If one state chooses to attack at time t and the other chooses to quit or attack at the same
time, both states receive their war payoffs, −wi. However, if both quit at time t, then state
i receives vi
2
− ci(t). These particular assumptions are not crucial because in equilibrium,
simultaneous concessions or attacks occur with probability 0. Finally, if states escalate the
conflict indefinitely, each state gets a payoff that is strictly less than its war payoff. Players’
payoff at time infinity would be interpreted as payoff of “perpetual conflict avoidance.” By
neglecting to address high-conflict situations, avoiders risk allowing problems to fester out
of their control. By assuming that players’ payoffs of perpetual conflict avoidance are worse
than their war payoff, we ensure that the leaders are confrontational. That is, the leaders
prefer confrontation even if the conflict may end badly for them.
Finally, I assume that there is some uncertainty about states’ resolve. In the spirit of
4See Section 3.1 for a detailed discussion.
5Note that this sign convention for wi is the reverse of the one that is used by Fearon (1994).
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Harsanyi (1967), each state has two types: resolved or flexible. The prior probability that
state i is resolved is denoted by zi ∈ (0, 1). Each state knows its own type but does not
know the opponent’s true type. The flexible types pick a strategy, given their beliefs, to
maximize their expected payoff in the crisis bargaining game. On the other hand, a resolved
type never backs down and never attacks. That is, a resolved type always chooses the action
“escalate.”6 Call this crisis game where all the parameters are common knowledge G.
A leader may commit not to back down in a crisis for reasons other than the prospects
of the crisis. For example, a leader may be resolved because of his firm belief that backing
down, and thus giving up for the prize, is simply a decision that will not be ratified by
domestic actors (Iida 1993). Therefore, the positive priors, zi’s, can be interpreted as the
players’ initial beliefs on the existence of such motives that may force the leaders not to quit.
Resolved types closely resemble the obstinate types that are first defined by Myerson
(1991) (r-insisting types) and studied further by Abreu and Gul (2000) and Kambe (1999).7
In a bilateral negotiation, obstinate types always demand a particular share and accept
an offer if and only if it weakly exceeds that share. Abreu and Sethi (2003) support the
existence of obstinate types from an evolutionary perspective and show that if players incur
a cost of rationality, even if it is very small, the absence of such types is not compatible with
evolutionary stability in a bargaining environment.
In the context of international crises, audience costs can be interpreted as the opportunity
cost of backing down. That is, it is the total value of the opportunities that are missed or not
used effectively by backing down from the hard-line policy. In the crisis bargaining literature,
there is a considerable amount of discussion concerning microfoundations of audience costs.
For instance, a leader that backs down from a public commitment may suffer audience costs
because the leader is less likely to be reelected (Smith 1998), has violated national honor
(Fearon 1994), or has lost his reputation and the credibility of his rhetoric (Sartori 2002,
Guisinger and Smith 2002).
6One can suppose that the resolved types never quit and attack only at time K ∈ R+. Clearly, if K = 0
or very close to 0, for example, then it will be a binding bound and thus alter flexible players’ equilibrium
strategies. However, if K is sufficiently large—in particular, larger than t∗, which is defined in Section 3—the
results of the paper will not be affected.
7These “strategy types” are first used in game theory by Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and
Roberts (1982), where commitments are modeled as behavioral types that exist in society so that rational
players can mimic them if it is optimal to do so.
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This interpretation provides additional insight into Fearon’s critical assumption that
audience costs increase with time. Public statements or messages that the leaders send in
crises are expected to serve an agenda states form. This agenda may include items that are
not directly related to the prize, such as increasing audiences’ support and the likelihood of
winning elections, building reputation for future negotiations, discouraging potential rivals,
and preventing future crises. Therefore, a leader’s expected value of following a hard-line
policy may increase with time because as time passes, the leader is more likely to convince
domestic and international audiences about his resolve, and persuaded audiences would
increase the likelihood of the successful execution of his agenda. As a result, if the expected
benefit of following the hard-line policy increases in time, then the opportunity cost of
backing down (i.e., audience costs) is expected to increase with time as well.
2.1. Strategies
The strategies of the resolved types are simple: never back down and never attack. On
the other hand, flexible types have the opportunity of credibly bluffing, manipulating the
adversaries’ belief, and thus building reputation as a leverage to increase their bargaining
power. Therefore, what motivates and interests the subsequent analyses are the optimal
(equilibrium) strategies of the flexible types.
A strategy σi = (Qi, Ai) of state i is defined by a pair of cumulative distributions.
Qi(t) : R+ ∪ {∞} → [0, 1] represents the probability that state i quits by time t (inclusive),
andAi(t) : R+∪{∞} → [0, 1] denotes the probability that state i attacks by time t (inclusive).
If state i’s strategy is Qi(t), then flexible state i’s strategy is Qi(t)/(1−z) because the resolved
types never quit. The same arguments hold for Ai(t). Note that Qi(t) + Ai(t) ≤ 1 − zi for
all t ≥ 0.
Given Qj and Aj, flexible state i’s expected payoff of quitting at time t is
Ui(t, Qj, Aj) := viQj(t)− wiAj(t) + [1−Qj(t)− Aj(t)] [−ci(t)]
+
(vi
2
− ci(t)
) [
Qj(t)−Qj(t−)
]
, (1)
with Qj(t
−) = limy↑tQj(y).
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3. Main Results
In this section, I analyze two special cases. These particular cases both convey the flavor
of the analysis and are the basic building blocks for the extended versions of the model
examined subsequently. For the rest of this section, I will assume that states’ audience cost
functions are linear ci(t) = tci and c1 > c2 > 0. Therefore, state 1 is more sensitive to
audience costs. However, states are identical in all other aspects. That is, vi = v > 0,
wi = w > 0, and zi = z for each i.
For the first special case, suppose that both states are known to be flexible (i.e., z = 0).
This is also a special case of Fearon’s model, and higher sensitivity to audience costs is
always an advantage for diplomatic success. This conclusion follows from the fact that in
the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this special case, state 2 quits at time 0, state 1
never quits, and thus, payoffs of states 1 and 2 are v and 0, respectively.
In equilibrium, state i does not back down beyond time ti, where i’s audience costs are
equal to its cost of war (i.e., tici = w). Since state 1 can generate higher audience costs (as
c1 > c2), we have t1 < t2. That is, states never attack before t1 and state 1 never quits after
t1. Therefore, if the conflict ever reaches time t1, then subgame perfection implies that state
2 must quit immediately. Thus, the crisis bargaining game ends prior to time t1. Moreover,
there exists no equilibrium in which state 1 quits prior to time t1. Suppose for a contradiction
that there is an equilibrium in which state 1 quits at time t where t ∈ [0, t1]. On the one
hand, state 2’s equilibrium strategy cannot dictate it to quit before time t because state 2
would achieve a higher payoff if it waited until time t and quitted at time t+, where  ≥ 0 is
small. On the other hand, state 2’s equilibrium strategy cannot dictate it to quit after time
t (and before time t1) because state 1 would achieve a higher payoff if state 1 waited until
time t1 and attacked afterwards. Therefore, in equilibrium, state 2 quits at time 0 because
it anticipates that state 1 never quits and that delaying the concession until time t1 has no
benefit.
The second case is more interesting. Now I resume the case where z is positive (i.e.,
z ∈ (0, 1)). In this case, each flexible state has the option of building reputation on its resolve
by bluffing and escalating the crisis. The equilibrium concept that I will use is sequential
equilibrium. A notable implication of the equilibrium is that sensitivity to audience costs is
not always an advantage for diplomatic success.
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In equilibrium, all sequential equilibria have the same Qi functions, and these functions
are nondegenerate cumulative distribution functions (i.e., truly mixed quitting strategies).8
In particular, each flexible state chooses the time of backing down randomly with a decreasing
hazard rate. That is, flexible states are more likely to quit at the early stages of the crisis
and less likely to quit as it escalates further. Moreover, escalation of the conflict stops at
some finite (deterministic) time t∗, a function of the primitives, with certainty, and no state
attacks before this time. Therefore, t∗—the equilibrium horizon of the game—is the time
beyond which no type quits. In what follows, I will prove all these claims and the main results
of the paper.
We describe state i’s behavior in the crisis game by a probability distribution over quitting
times, and we allow Qi(0) > 0, so i may quit immediately with positive probability. Let λi(t)
be state i’s instantaneous quitting (or hazard) rate at time t with the condition that no state
has backed down or attacked before this time. Therefore, by definition, λi(t) =
dQi(t)/dt
1−Qi(t) .
Since there is no pure strategy equilibrium,9 we look for an equilibrium where flexible player
j mixes between quitting and escalating. Flexible j is indifferent between quitting at time t
and waiting for an infinitesimal period ∆ and then quit at time t+ ∆ if and only if
−tcj = vλi(t)∆− [1− λi(t)∆](t+ ∆)cj,
where λi(t)∆ is the probability that i quits in the interval ∆.
10 Solving this equation for
λi(t) and taking its limit as ∆ approaches zero yields
λi(t) =
cj
v + tcj
.
Note that the last expression and the definition for λi(t) imply the differential equation
− d
dt
ln(1−Qi(t)) = d
dt
ln(v + tcj),
which can be directly solved to yield
Qi(t) = 1−
(
1−Qi(0)
)
v
v + tcj
.
8There are still multiple sequential equilibria as the Ai’s can vary.
9Proposition 1 proves that there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
10I assume, without loss of generality, that ci(t + ∆) < w for i = 1, 2, so that both states prefer backing
down over attacking before time t + ∆.
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Proposition 1. The crisis game G has a sequential equilibrium. Any σ =
(
(Q1, A1), (Q2, A2)
)
is a sequential equilibrium of G if and only if t∗ ≤ w
c1
exists such that, for i = 1, 2, the fol-
lowing conditions hold:
1. Qi(t) = 1− (1−Qi(0))vv+tcj for all t ≤ t∗,
2. Q1(0)Q2(0) = 0,
3. Qi(t
∗) = 1− z if t∗ < w/c1 and Q1(t∗) ≤ Q2(t∗) = 1− z if t∗ = w/c1, and
4. Ai(t) = 0 for all t < t
∗ and limk→∞Ai(k) = 1− z −Qi(t∗).
Proof. Let σ =
(
(Q1, A1), (Q2, A2)
)
define a sequential equilibrium. I will argue that σ
must have the form specified and that these strategies do indeed define an equilibrium. For
i = 1, 2, let κi = inf{t ≥ 0|Qi(t) = limk→∞Qi(k)}, where inf ∅ := ∞. That is, κi denotes
the time beyond which state i does not quit. Then:11
(i) κ1 = κ2: A flexible player does not delay quitting once he knows that his opponent
will never quit.
(ii) If Qi jumps at t, then Qj is constant at some -neighborhood of t: the reason is that j
would always want to wait for some small  > 0 amount of time in order to enjoy the
discrete chance of i quitting.
(iii) If Qi is constant between (t
′, t′′), then so is Qj: if i will not quit between (t′, t′′), then
if j plans to quit in this interval, he does better to quit immediately at t′ rather than
wait to some time t > t′.
(iv) There is no interval (t′, t′′) with t′′ < κ1 on which Q1 and Q2 are constant: if so, i
would do better to quit at t′′ −  than to quit at t′′, leading to contradiction.
(v) If t′ < t′′ < κ1, then Qi(t′′) > Qi(t′) for i = 1, 2: as we noted in (iii), if Qi is constant
on some interval (t′, t′′), then the optimality of Qj implies that Qj is also constant on
(t′, t′′). Therefore, the conditions (iii) and (iv) imply (v).
11Proofs of the arguments (i) − (v) directly follow from the proof of Proposition 1 in Abreu and Gul
(2000) and are analogous to the arguments in Hendricks, Weiss and Wilson (1988). Therefore, I skip the
details.
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From (i) − (v), it follows that Q1 and Q2 must be continuous and strictly increasing on
[0, t∗], where t∗ = κ1 = κ2. That is, flexible players are indifferent between quitting at time
t < t∗ and waiting for an infinitesimal period ∆ and then quit at time t + ∆ < t∗. But
then, players must be quitting with the hazard rates λ1, λ2 that are defined above. Thus, as
derived previously, Qi(t) = 1− (1−Qi(0))vv+tcj for all t ≤ t∗. By (ii), both Q1(0) and Q2(0) cannot
be positive, implying that Q1(0)Q2(0) = 0.
Since Qi is strictly increasing on [0, t
∗], it must be the case that t∗ ≤ w/c1 < w/c2.
Therefore, Ai(t) = 0 for all t < t
∗. Since escalating forever is costlier than attacking and
Qi(t) +Ai(t) ≤ 1− z for all t ≥ 0, we must have limk→∞Ai(k) = 1− z −Qi(t∗) for i = 1, 2.
Finally, since a flexible player will not delay quitting once he knows his opponent will never
quit and will not attack before time t∗, we can conclude that Qi(t∗) = 1 − z for i = 1, 2
if t∗ < w/c1. However, when t∗ = w/c1, state 1 (and only state 1) will be indifferent
between quitting at time t∗ and attacking at (or after) time t∗. Therefore, we must have
Q1(t
∗) ≤ Q2(t∗) = 1− z if t∗ = w/c1.
Finally, suppose now that the strategies σ =
(
(Q1, A1), (Q2, A2)
)
satisfy the conditions
that are given by 1-4. Note that the value of t∗ is determined by the conditions 1-3 (see
Lemma 1). Recall the derivation of the hazard rates λ1 and λ2. Given Qj, flexible state i is
indifferent between quitting at time t′ and waiting for some time and then quitting at time
t′′, where 0 ≤ t′ < t′′ ≤ t∗. Hence, any mixed strategy on the support [0, t∗], in particular, Qi
is optimal for player i. According to the strategies, Qi(t
∗) = 1−z. This is optimal for flexible
state i when t∗ < w/c1 < w/c2. In addition, if t∗ = w/c1, then state 1 will be indifferent
between quitting at time t∗ and attacking at some time after (or at) time t∗. Therefore,
Q1(t
∗) ≤ 1− z is optimal for flexible state 1 if t∗ = w/c1. According to the σ, state 2 never
attacks (i.e., A2(t) = 0 for all t), whereas state 1 may attack with a positive probability at
some time after t∗. Since the timing of attacking beyond t∗ does not change flexible state
1’s payoff, any A1 satisfying condition 4 is also optimal. Hence, σ is indeed an equilibrium.
State i’s hazard rate λi(t) = cj/(v + tcj) is decreasing with time. Since j’s audience
costs increases with time, i’s quitting (hazard) rate must be bigger at earlier times of the
escalation to make j indifferent between quitting and escalating at all times. Note that
the hazard rate depends upon only two parameters: (1) the value of the prize and (2)
the opponent’s audience costs coefficient. Therefore, higher values for the prize will make
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states’ concession rates lower, and this prediction is consistent with intuition. Moreover,
since c1 > c2, we have λ1(t) < λ2(t). That is, state 2 quits with a greater rate. Therefore,
conditional on that Q1(0) = Q2(0) = 0 and that the game G reaches time t > 0, the posterior
probability that state 2 is resolved will be greater than the posterior probability that state
1 is resolved. The last observation implies that state 2 can build its reputation much faster
if Qi(0)s are the same, and thus, it is easier for state 2 to convince the adversary (about
its resolve) if it bluffs. As I will show in the next proposition, this reputational advantage
of the second state will put it into an advantageous position12 even though state 2 is in an
unfavorable condition regarding its ability to generate audience costs.
The following two lemmata solve the equilibrium horizon of the crisis game t∗ as a func-
tion of the primitives and provide the unique equilibrium strategies Q1(t) and Q2(t). The
equilibrium value of t∗ can be derived by conditions 1-3 in Proposition 1. However, instead
of providing this mechanical derivation, I will present an alternative proof that elucidates
the equilibrium dynamics of the crisis bargaining game G, in particular, players’ reputational
concerns.
Lemma 1. In a sequential equilibrium, the crisis bargaining game G ends by time t∗ =
min{t∗1, t∗2}, where t∗i = min
{
w
ci
, v(1−z)
zcj
}
for i, j ∈ {1, 2} with j 6= i.
Proof. In equilibrium, if state i believes that j will never quit after time t and ci(t) < w, then
the flexible i will immediately quit at this time. There are two critical thresholds beyond
which i believes that state j will never quit. One of them is the time that state j’s reputation
reaches 1, and the other is the time t satisfying tcj = w.
Given that j does not quit at time 0 with a positive probability (i.e., Qj(0) = 0), state i
will be convinced that j is resolved by time τj, solving Qj(τj) = 1− vv+τjci = 1− z, implying
τj =
v(1−z)
zci
. In equilibrium, Qj(0) would take values more than 0. Therefore, i will be
convinced that j is resolved no later than τj. Hence, state i never backs down after time
t∗j = min
{
w
cj
, v(1−z)
zci
}
. Similar arguments hold for state j, that is, flexible i never quits after
time t∗i = min
{
w
ci
, v(1−z)
zcj
}
.
When, for example, t∗1 < t
∗
2 and the conflict escalates until time t
∗
1, flexible 2 ends the
game at this time for sure because he knows that state 1 will never quit beyond this point.
12This term will be formally defined later.
12
As a result, the crisis bargaining game will end no later than t∗ = min{t∗1, t∗2}. Next, I will
show that the game G cannot end before time t∗. Suppose that the game ends at time tˆ,
where tˆ < t∗. According to the equilibrium strategies given by Proposition 1, Q2(0) > 0
must hold. Otherwise, state 2’s reputation will not reach 1 at time tˆ (i.e., Q2(tˆ) = 1− z will
not hold), which contradicts the optimality of Q2. With the same reasoning, we must have
Q1(0) > 0 because otherwise Q1(tˆ) = 1−z will not hold (note that tˆ < t∗1 ≤ w/c1). However,
having Q1(0) > 0 and Q2(0) > 0 simultaneously contradicts the optimality of Qis (recall
condition 2 of Proposition 1.) Hence, in equilibrium, given that flexible players randomize
the timing of quitting, escalation continues until time t∗ = min{t∗1, t∗2} with some positive
probability and stops at this time with certainty.
Lemma 2. In a sequential equilibrium, if t∗i > t
∗
j , then
Qj(t) = 1− v
v + tci
and Qi(t) = 1− (1−Qi(0))v
v + tcj
,
where
Qi(0) =
{
(1− z)[1− zcj
ci
], if w
cj
> v(1−z)
zci
1− z − zw
v
, otherwise.
Proof. Since t∗i > t
∗
j , we have t
∗ = t∗j . Therefore,
v(1−z)
zcj
= τi > t
∗ and w/ci > t∗. Recall that
τi is the time satisfying Qi(τi) = 1− z if Qi(0) = 0. Since the game ends before time τi and
w/ci > t
∗ holds, we must have Qi(t∗) = 1− z. Hence, we have Qi(0) > 0. According to the
second condition of Proposition 1, we must have Q1(0)Q2(0) = 0. The last condition with
Qi(0) > 0 implies that we must have Qj(0) = 0.
Qj(0) = 0 implies Qj(t) = 1− vv+tci . Moreover, since Qi(t∗j) = 1−
(1−Qi(0))v
v+t∗j cj
= 1− z, we
have Qi(0) = 1− z − cjt
∗
j z
v
, where t∗j = min
{
w
cj
, v(1−z)
zci
}
. This completes the proof.
Note that if t∗i > t
∗
j , then in equilibrium, state i (and only state i) quits with a positive
probability at time 0. That is, Qi(0) > 0 and Qj(0) = 0.
Definition 1. State i is called advantaged in the crisis bargaining game G if flexible i’s
expected payoff is strictly positive in any sequential equilibrium of the game G.
13
In equilibrium with horizon t∗, states’ strategies entail quitting at any time before t∗.
Using Eq. (1) and Proposition 1, we see that for any small  > 0, the equilibrium payoff of
flexible state i is
Ui = vQj()− wAj() + [−ci()] [1−Qj()− Aj()] +
[v
2
− ci()
]
[Qj()−Qj(−)]
= vQj() + [−ci()][1−Qj()].
Taking → 0 thus yields
Ui = vQj(0) + [−ci(0)][1−Qj(0)]
= vQj(0), (2)
We know from Proposition 1 that Q1(0)Q2(0) = 0 must hold in equilibrium. Thus, for all
parameter values, at most one state is advantaged in the crisis bargaining game G. Suppose
for now that the parameters of the game G satisfy t∗i > t
∗
j . Therefore, according to the
equilibrium strategies given in Lemma 2, Ui = 0, whereas Uj = vQi(0) > 0. Thus, the
following result immediately follows from these discussions.
Corollary 1. State j is advantaged in the crisis bargaining game G if and only if the pa-
rameters of the game satisfy t∗i > t
∗
j .
Proposition 2. State 1—the one that is more sensitive to audience costs—is advantaged in
the crisis bargaining game G if and only if the inequality
v
w
>
z
1− z
holds, i.e., if and only if the benefit-cost ratio, v/w, exceeds the relative likelihood, z/(1− z),
of a state being the resolved type.
Proof. As we previously discussed, state 1 is advantaged in the game G if and only if t∗1 < t
∗
2.
Since c1 > c2, we have
w
c1
< w
c2
, and τ1 =
v(1−z)
zc2
> τ2 =
v(1−z)
zc1
. Thus, t∗1 < t
∗
2 holds if and
only if w
c1
< v(1−z)
zc1
. The last inequality yields the desired result. With a similar reasoning, if
w
c1
> v(1−z)
zc1
holds, then we have t∗2 < t
∗
1, implying that state 2 is advantaged.
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Remark 1. Note that state 2—the one that is less sensitive to audience costs—is advantaged
in the crisis bargaining game G whenever the benefit-cost ratio is smaller than the relative
likelihood of a state being the resolved type (i.e., v
w
< z
1−z ).
Being the advantaged state does not mean that this state will get the prize with certainty.
In equilibrium, both states can get the prize or suffer audience costs with positive proba-
bilities. However, for any t ≤ t∗, the probability that the advantaged state gets the prize
prior to time t is higher. Proposition 2 implies, in contrast with conventional wisdom, that
the ability of generating greater audience costs is not always an advantage. Depending on
the parameter values, equilibrium can be grouped into two categories: The first one, which
includes all the values of the parameters satisfying v
w
> z
1−z , is a regime such that state 1
is advantaged. In this case, the horizon of the conflict is w/c1. The second category, where
the set of parameters satisfy v
w
< z
1−z , is the second regime, where state 2 is advantaged. In
this case, the horizon of the conflict is v(1−z)
zc1
. Note that when z is small, we are in the first
regime, and things are as in Fearon. In particular, there is no discontinuity when resolved
types are introduced into Fearon’s model.
State 1’s sensitivity to audience costs (in particular, c1) negatively affects equilibrium
horizon, and this is true regardless of the regime. Therefore, when states can generate
greater audience costs, fewer escalatory steps are needed to credibly communicate one’s
preferences. Thus, crisis between democratic states should see significantly fewer escalatory
steps than crisis between authoritarian states (Fearon 1994).
The probability of a peaceful initial resolution is the sum of the states’ initial concessions
(i.e., Q1(0) +Q2(0)). In regime 1, only the second state makes the initial concession. There-
fore, Q1(0) = 0 and Q2(0) = 1− z− zwv by Lemma 2. As a result, a higher benefit-cost ratio
of the crisis—given that the regime does not change—increases the probability of a peaceful
initial resolution. That is, disputes with low cost of war or a high value for the prize are
more likely to settle without any escalation. And if these disputes turn into public crises,
then they are more likely to have less escalatory steps.
The probability that flexible state 1 will initiate war in equilibrium is
qA = max
{
1− wc2
(1− z)[vc1 + wc2] , 0
}
.
Recall that flexible states never initiate war in regime 2. Therefore, the probability of
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war (weakly) increases as the value of the prize increases. As the value of the prize is larger,
the autocratic state—the one that is less sensitive to audience costs—is less likely to dispute
the democratic state’s threat. But if the crisis escalates, then the probability of war will be
greater. Moreover, the probability of war decreases as the cost of war increases.
3.1. Comparison with Fearon’s Model
The timing of the crisis bargaining game G is identical to Fearon’s original game. The
only difference between Fearon’s and the current setup is the way they model uncertainty.
Note that both models yield the same results for small values of z, in particular, when
v
w
> z
1−z . By contrast, Fearon’s analysis does not hold, and the setup in this paper yields
different results when it puts enough weight on the prospect of facing a resolved type that
will never back down (a high enough z).
Fearon (1994) assumes that each state is uncertain about the opponent’s cost of war but
knows its own. That is, states’ beliefs are represented by a distribution function F over the
set of types [0, w¯], where 0 < w¯. Fearon shows, in Lemma 2, that in equilibrium with horizon
t∗, the set of types is divided into three classes:
(i) All the types wi ∈ [0, w¯] satisfying wi < ci(t∗) never quit.
(ii) All the types wi ∈ [0, w¯] satisfying wi > ci(t∗) back down before time t∗ with certainty.
(iii) The type wi ∈ [0, w¯] satisfying wi = ci(t∗) will be indifferent between quitting and
attacking at time t∗.
Therefore, in equilibrium, audience costs separate the players (types) according to their
willingness to quit. In equilibrium with horizon t∗ > 0, the probability that state 1 follows a
strategy in which he never quits is equal to F (c1(t
∗)) (i.e., the probability that wi ≤ ci(t∗)).
Likewise, the probability that state 2 follows a strategy in which he never quits is equal to
F (c2(t
∗)). Since c1(t∗) > c2(t∗) (at least for the linear audience costs case), then F (c1(t∗)) >
F (c2(t
∗)). That is, the probability of facing a resolved type that will never back down is always
greater for player 2. This makes state 1 advantaged regardless of the primitives.
To be able to draw analogies between Fearon’s model and the current one, consider an
equilibrium with horizon t∗ > 0. When z is low (in particular v
w
> z
1−z holds), then my
model will generate dynamics that are similar to Fearon’s original model. In equilibrium,
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we will have w = c1(t
∗) > c2(t∗), where t∗ = w/c1 since i’s audience costs is ci(t) = cit, and
flexible state 1 will quit before t∗ with some probability that is strictly less than 1. We know
these from the analyses that are presented earlier in this section and are neither implied by
nor derived from Fearon’s analyses. Given these observations, one can use Fearon’s above
arguments and conclude that in equilibrium, the initial probability that state 2 is facing a
resolved type is equal to z+[1− Q1(t∗)
(1−z) ], where 1−Q1(t∗)/(1−z) > 0 denotes the probability
that flexible state 1 does not quit. However, the probability that state 1 is facing a resolved
type is exactly equal to z. Similar to Fearon (1994), the probability of facing a resolved type
is greater for player 2, making state 1 advantaged.
On the other hand, if z is high (or v
w
< z
1−z holds), then we will have w > c1(t
∗) > c2(t∗),
where t∗ = v(1 − z)/zc1. In this case, flexible types of both states will certainly quit
before time t∗. Once again, these observations are implied by the previous analyses of this
section, not by Fearon’s model. Given these outcomes and Fearon’s above arguments, we
can conclude that, in equilibrium, the initial probability of facing a resolved type is equal
to z for both states. Note that z is the probability that a state is resolved, and thus, it
is the lower boundary for the probability of facing a resolved type. Since both states face
the resolved type with the same probabilities, state 1 will lose its favorable position that is
implied in the previous case. Recall that state 2 can build its reputation at a faster rate since
λ1(t) < λ2(t) for all t, making state 2 advantaged. This case never occurs in Fearon’s model
because the probability of facing a resolved type is endogenously derived in equilibrium and
the probability that player 2 faces a resolved type is always greater than the probability that
player 1 faces a resolved type.
4. Level vs. Derivative of Audience Costs
The main result of this paper—that higher audience costs are not always good—may
raise serious queries about the validity of the audience cost mechanism. The final arguments
of the previous section technically explain why the results of the current paper and Fearon
(1994) diverge. The main result of this paper should not be interpreted against the audience
costs mechanism. On the contrary, the analyses indicate that we must distinguish between
the level of audience costs (i.e., ci(t)) and the derivative of audience costs (i.e., c
′
i(t)).
13
13I am grateful to the referees whose comments shaped the discussion in this section greatly.
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Thus, generating higher audience costs may be good or bad depending on how states produce
these costs. If a state can generate greater audience costs by keeping its derivative low, then
this is good. However, generating audience costs simply by producing greater c′i(t) would be
bad. In this section, I will slightly extend the model to clarify the distinct impacts of the
level and the derivative of audience costs.
In this section, I let ci(t) to be a positive, increasing, and differentiable function of time.
Similar to the analyses in the previous section, let λi(t) be state i’s quitting rate at time t.
Then flexible j is indifferent between quitting at time t and t+ ∆ if and only if
−cj(t) = vλi(t)∆− [1− λi(t)∆]cj(t+ ∆).
Solving this equation for λi(t) and taking its limit as ∆ approaches 0 yields
λi(t) =
c′j(t)
v + cj(t)
.
Integrating up the hazard rate gives
Qi(t) = 1− v + cj(0)
v + cj(t)
[1−Qi(0)].
If c′j(t) is higher while cj(t) is the same, then i quits at a faster rate, implying that it
can build its reputation faster. However, if j keeps its derivative the same but increases its
level (i.e., cj(t)), then state i needs to quit at a slower rate, making i slower at building its
reputation.
Suppose for now that ci(t) = tci +di, where ci, di > 0 for i = 1, 2. This simple example is
sufficient to make some important comparative statics analyses. The term di could measure
the sunk costs that are financially costly ex-ante (such as mobilizing troops), while ci could
measure freedom of the press (the idea being that with a freer press, conflict escalation
translates more quickly into political pressure). Similar arguments in the proof of Lemma 1
implies that in equilibrium, state 1 will not quit after time
t∗2 = min
{
w − d2
c2
,
(1− z)(v + d1)
zc1
}
.
The first ratio is the time t beyond which state 2 prefers to attack (i.e., c2(t) = w). The
second term is the time t that state 2’s reputation reaches 1 (i.e., Q2(t) = 1− z). Likewise,
state 2 will not quit after time
t∗1 = min
{
w − d1
c1
,
(1− z)(v + d2)
zc2
}
.
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Hence, the horizon of the crisis bargaining game will be t∗ = min{t∗1, t∗2}, and state i will be
advantaged if and only if t∗i < t
∗
j (Corollary 1).
Suppose first that ci = c for i = 1, 2, but d1 > d2 so that the states’ derivatives of
audience costs are the same, but state 1 always has a higher level of audience costs. Since
w−d1
c
< w−d2
c
and (1−z)(v+d2)
zc
< (1−z)(v+d1)
zc
hold, we have t∗1 < t
∗
2. Thus, the following result
immediately follows.
Corollary 2. Suppose that ci(t) = tc + di, where c > 0 and d1 > d2 > 0. State 1 is
advantaged in the crisis bargaining game G regardless of the values of v, w, z, or c.
On the other hand, if we let c1 > c2 but di = d > 0 for i = 1, 2, then we achieve a
result similar to Proposition 2. That is, state 1 is advantaged if and only if z < v+d
v+w
. Hence,
we can conclude that a higher level of audience costs is always advantageous, but a higher
derivative of audience costs is not.
5. Concluding Remarks
The primary message of the model is that the audience costs mechanism is not always
helping leaders to attain diplomatic success. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the ability of
generating greater audience costs may be good or bad depending on (1) the benefit-cost ratio
of the crisis (i.e., v/w); (2) initial probability of resolve, z; and (3) the states’ sensitivities
to audience costs (i.e., ci(t)).
In Fearon’s setup, the democratic state—the one that can generate higher audience
costs—always has a reputational advantage because in equilibrium, the probability of facing
a resolved opponent is always lower (higher) for the democratic (the autocratic) state. This
reputational superiority of the democratic state compensates the drawbacks of having greater
sensitivity to audience costs. The current model destroys the democratic state’s reputational
privilege by allowing a setup in which states’ initial probability of resolve is independent of
their costs of war or valuations for the prize.
In the current model, increasing a player’s audience costs may increase or decrease his
own payoff, depending on how the equilibrium horizon (i.e., the time beyond which no type
quits) is determined. In particular, if the horizon is determined as in the model of Fearon (i.e.,
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the horizon is the time at which audience costs are so high that all types prefer attacking
over backing down), then increasing audience costs increases payoffs, for much the same
reason as in Fearon (1994). If instead the horizon is determined as in the work of Abreu
and Gul (i.e., the horizon is the time at which players become certain that the opponent
is the resolved type), then increasing audience costs decreases payoffs, for much the same
reason as increasing delay costs decreases payoffs in Abreu and Gul (2000).14 Therefore, this
paper shows that the Fearon regime obtains when the benefit-cost ratio of war is high or
the initial probability of resolve is low, whereas the Abreu and Gul regime obtains when the
benefit-cost ratio is low or when the initial probability of resolve is high.
Furthermore, analyses suggest that how a state generates its audience costs may play
an important role in its diplomatic success. Generating higher levels of audience costs (i.e.,
higher ci(t)) is always good for a state given that the state can keep c
′
i(t) low. However,
generating higher levels of audience costs with high derivative may be bad—depending on
the benefit-cost ratio of the crisis.
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